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Corporate Criminal Liability for Algorithmic
Price-Fixing in Canada
Theo Milosevic*
INTRODUCTION
The use of computerized algorithms is increasingly common in the modern
business environment.1 An algorithm can be defined as ‘‘a set of mathematical
instructions or rules that, especially if given to a computer, will help to calculate
an answer to a problem.”2 As noted in this definition, algorithms are particularly
powerful tools when combined with computing power.
The proliferation of computerized algorithms in business settings has
occasionally led to unintended and injurious outcomes. This is perhaps most
notable in relation to the algorithmic trading of securities. The 2010 ‘‘Flash
Crash” of the United States (U.S.) financial markets, during which key markets
lost and then regained over a trillion dollars in value over the span of 36 minutes,
was caused, at least in part, by the intentional manipulation of algorithmic
trading processes.3 Another example is that of Knight Capital, a financial
services firm, which, in 2012, lost approximately USD 440 million in just 45
minutes due to a faulty algorithm.4 Unsurprisingly, securities regulators stand at
the forefront of regulating algorithms, with U.S. and European (E.U.) agencies
both developing policies in this regard.5,6 Complying with regulations aimed at
algorithms will be a novel challenge for the financial trading industry.
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However, the use of computerized algorithms also carries substantial
compliance-related implications for companies outside of the trading field.
This is particularly notable in regard to the intersection between competition law
and the algorithmic pricing used in online retail. This paper examines the issue of
corporate criminal liability in Canada for potential violations of price-fixing laws
resulting from the use of algorithmic pricing. The central argument of the paper
is that it is possible to both legally establish and theoretically justify criminal
punishment in situations where humans have arranged a price-fixing agreement
and use pricing algorithms as the tool to carry out the agreement. However, in
situations where algorithmic price-fixing is an unintended outcome that results
from the semi-autonomous or autonomous development of a pricing algorithm,
the imposition of criminal liability may be difficult to legally establish and to
justify. As such, I argue that a civil provision for regulating price-fixing is the
appropriate tool to address algorithmic price-fixing that results absent explicit
intent or direction by the human designer. The lens of analysis for these
arguments is Canadian price-fixing legislation in their current form.
The paper is structured in five parts. Part I provides an overview of
algorithms as a concept and tool by briefly examining the range of uses for
algorithms in modern businesses. Part II explores the interconnection between
pricing algorithms and competition law, drawing on empirical and theoretical
examples in the process. Third, the paper examines corporate criminal liability
under the Criminal Code of Canada7 and s. 45 of the Competition Act8 (the
‘‘Act”), and assesses whether and how the use of algorithms complicates the
assessment of corporate criminal liability. Fourth, the paper shifts to the
question of how to justify criminal punishment for algorithmic price-fixing under
utilitarian and normative theories of punishment. The paper concludes by
summarizing the argument that the use of criminal price-fixing provisions should
be limited to instances in which humans deliberately arrange a price-fixing
agreement that uses pricing algorithms as the tool to carry out the agreement.

OVERVIEW OF COMPUTERIZED ALGORITHMS
At the most basic level, algorithms are a simple concept. An algorithm is a
systematic set of steps that one uses to reach a desired outcome. Algorithms are
used in many day-to-day aspects of society, and the history of algorithms can be
traced to fields such as food preparation, grammar, and medicine. 9 The field of
mathematics is most closely linked to the development of algorithms as a formal
tool and a general concept, and, upon the development of computing technology,
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the ways in which algorithms were used in mathematics quickly gained traction
in the field of computer science.10
Algorithms in computer science vary in terms of specific purpose but are
generally based around the same general principle, whereby a defined set of input
data is subjected to one or multiple specific procedures in order to produce
outputs which are intended to solve a particular problem or reach a desired end
point. Computerized algorithms are typically able to accomplish that which
would not be possible manually due to the processing power and
interconnectivity of modern computers. These factors allow computerized
algorithms to access a greater range of data than would be accessible by
humans, and to process this vast data and enact changes in the algorithmic
output faster than humans are able to.11
At focus in this paper are algorithmic pricing systems used by online
retailers. Online retailers use algorithms with the goal of setting the ‘‘optimal”
price relative to market dynamics. Computerized pricing algorithms offer
significant advantages over manual price-setting as they can access and process
more data than humans and can automatically reflect pricing alterations faster
and with more frequency than would be possible manually.12 These pricing
algorithms vary, as they can be used to either assign a good or service an initial
price, or to continuously update the price of a given good or service. In both of
these scenarios, the algorithm is designed to achieve a goal such as setting a price
which matches demand exactly, or setting a price that is in some way competitive
relative to other sellers in the market.13 The key aspects of pricing algorithms are
the factors employed to determine price levels, such as competitor pricing,
market trends, demand, inventory, and individualized consumer information
such as purchasing history. 14 Pricing algorithms have become relatively
ubiquitous in e-commerce, and are particularly pervasive in large online
marketplaces such as Amazon Marketplace, which bring together many
retailers selling similar or identical goods.15
There are two further points of interest in regard to the use of computerized
algorithms. First, these algorithms are sometimes structured as iterative
processes which are able to ‘‘learn” by autonomously incorporating new data
10
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and weighing data differently based on the success of results or shifting market
dynamics.16 For example, homestay platform AirBnB uses a pricing algorithm
that bases prices off of the key characteristics of each listed property, such as
number of bedrooms, location, and amenities, and market dynamics, such as
seasonal patterns and demand. However, this model is not static. It is
continuously judging its price-setting against actual outcomes, meaning it
gathers information regarding whether there is a shortage or excess of demand
for a particular property at a given price level. It subsequently incorporates that
information into the model and adjusts its weighting of pricing factors to try to
achieve price levels that reduce inefficiencies associated with excesses or
shortages in demand.17 This dynamic process is called ‘‘machine-learning” and
creates a system whereby the pricing algorithm is autonomously changing and
growing.
The second point is that the increasing prevalence of algorithms means that
they frequently interact. For example, a pricing algorithm used by an online
retailer may incorporate competitor pricing, which could itself have been
determined by pricing algorithms based on competitor pricing. This interaction
between algorithms creates the possibility for a number of unintended and
potentially harmful consequences such as feedback loops between two closely
linked algorithms. This was the case in 2011, when the price of a book sold by
two retailers on Amazon rose from under USD 100 to over USD 23 million in
less than a week. One observer attributed this sudden increase to each retailer
designing their pricing algorithm to price the book predominantly as a function
of the other retailer’s price, creating a system whereby a slight variation in the
price of one retailer’s book caused both algorithms to enter into a theoretically
endless cycle of price escalation without the knowledge of either retailer. 18 It is
massively difficult to predict how, if, and when phenomena of this nature will
occur, but the potential for such problems underscores the compliance-related
issues facing the use of computerized algorithms.
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PRICING ALGORITHMS AND COMPETITION LAW
A growing amount of regulatory focus 19, jurisprudence 20, scholarly
thought,21 and media attention22 is focused on the interrelation between the
use of algorithms and price-fixing.
Price-fixing, which is closely linked to the concepts of cartels, collusion, and
conspiracy, is, in many jurisdictions, a criminal offence directed at preventing
‘‘agreements between two or more persons to prevent or unduly lessen
competition or to unreasonably enhance the price of a product.”23 The precise
nature of price-fixing offences varies by jurisdiction, but, at the broadest level,
they generally require intent by multiple parties to control the price of a product.
Marketplace and competition regulators have explicitly focused on the
potential intersection between algorithmic pricing and price-fixing since at least
the beginning of 2017. This regulatory focus is evident in a June 2017 roundtable
on ‘‘Algorithms and Collusion,” held by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).24
Existing academic work25 and litigation26 related to algorithms and pricefixing laws focuses on pricing algorithms, such as those used in the Amazon
19
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COMP/WD (2017) 12 (2017) [EU OECD Paper; OECD Financial and Enterprise
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Doc. No. DAF/COMP/WD (2017)41 (2017) [US OECD Paper]; OECD Financial and
Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, Algorithms and Collusion—Background
Note by the Secretariat, Doc. No. DAF/COMP/ (2017)4 (2017).
See e.g. Meyer v. Uber Technologies Inc. , No. 16-2750 (US 2nd Ct, 2017) [Meyer]; United
States v. Topkins (2015) CR 15-00201 WHO, online <www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/628891/download> [Topkins].
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‘‘Developing Competition Law for Collusion by Autonomous Price-Setting Agents,”
(2017), [unpublished, online at SSRN: <ssrn.com/abstract=3037818>]; Ariel Ezrachi
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Salil K. Mehra, ‘‘Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms”
(2016) 100 Minn L Rev 1323; Andreas Heinemann & Aleksandra Gebicka, ‘‘Can
Computers Form Cartels? About the Need for European Institutions to Revise the
Concentration Doctrine in the Information Age” (2016) 7:7 J Eur Competition Law &
Practice 431.
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<www.newyorker.com/business/currency/when-bots-collude>; David Lynch, “PoliPolicing the digital cartels”, Financial Times (8 January 2017), online: <www.ft.com/
content/9de9fb80-cd23-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2>.
Competition Bureau, ‘‘Price-fixing” (22 February 2018), online: <www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00112.html>.
See supra note 19 for background papers submitted as part of the OECD roundtable.

422 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[16 C.J.L.T.]

Marketplace, and points towards a spectrum of ways in which the use of
algorithms can potentially lead to violations of price-fixing laws. At one end of
this spectrum — likely the clearer end in terms of assessing corporate liability —
lie firms which intentionally arrange a traditional conspiracy agreement but use
coordinated algorithmic price-setting as the tool to carry out the agreement. At
the other, more opaque, end of this theoretical spectrum lie situations in which
some sort of coordinated price-fixing may occur due solely to the autonomous
decision-making of price-setting algorithms. The following section will develop a
conceptual framework for understanding the ways in which algorithms can relate
to price-fixing.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ALGORITHMIC PRICING AND PRICE-FIXING
In a simple corporate structure of one company without parents, subsidies,
or affiliates, one can consider the relationship between algorithmic pricing and
price-fixing to fall along a spectrum of human control. On one end of this
spectrum, humans exercise significant control over the price-fixing function of
pricing algorithms. On the other, the use of largely autonomous pricing
algorithms may lead to outcomes which resemble traditional price-fixing.
The clear end of this spectrum is the use of algorithmic pricing by humans as
a tool for price-fixing. This has been termed the ‘‘messenger” 27 category of
collusion, and conforms well with traditional notions of liability for price-fixing.
The first North American price-fixing charge related to the use of algorithmic
pricing falls under this category. In 2015, the United States Department of
Justice Antitrust Division charged California resident David Topkins with pricefixing for his conduct as a director of an e-commerce company selling posters
between 2013 and 2014.28 Topkins, who subsequently pled guilty, and coconspirators from competitor companies agreed to fix prices of certain posters
sold on Amazon Marketplace, and adopted ‘‘specific pricing algorithms for the
agreed upon posters with the goal of coordinating changes to their respective
prices.”29 In response to the charge, Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General of the
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, said, ‘‘[w]e will not tolerate
anticompetitive conduct, whether it occurs in a smoke-filled room or over the
Internet using complex pricing algorithms.”30

25
26
27
28
29
30

See supra note 21.
See supra note 20.
Ezrachi & Stucke, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence,” supra note 12 at 10.
Topkins, supra note 20.
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On the other end of the spectrum are situations in which pricing algorithms,
in pursuit of a human-determined end goal, leverage machine learning to
autonomously determine the best means of achieving this target. This has been
termed the ‘‘autonomous machines”31 scenario, and creates the potential for
algorithms working alone or in concert to determine that some form of
coordinated price-fixing or market sharing is the best strategy to achieve their
intended goal. While the evidence of any such activity is limited, anecdotal, and
somewhat speculative,32 machine learning capacity, interconnection between
algorithms, and the present pace of technological development brings it into the
realm of possibility.33 It is thought that such a situation is most likely to arise in a
stable and concentrated market ‘‘involving homogenous products where the
algorithms can monitor to a sufficient degree the pricing and other keys terms of
sale.”34
This situation would pose a significant dilemma for regulators and policymakers as it would create outcomes similar to traditional price-fixing, but absent
any formal intent or agreement which problematizes notions of liability.
In between these two ends of the spectrum is a gray-zone termed the
‘‘predictable agent”35 scenario, wherein industry dynamics lead competitors to
develop pricing algorithms that they know will likely lead to shifts in market
structure. For example, an online retailer, possessing the intent to shift market
dynamics in terms of supply or price, could design a pricing algorithm that they
know will interact with competitors’ pricing schemes to achieve such a goal.
These situations are characterized by a lack of explicit agreements between
competitors, and recent academic work has argued that pricing algorithms are
particularly well-designed to facilitate tacit collusion of this nature. 36
Pricing algorithms can also run up against price-fixing laws in ‘‘hub-andspoke” scenarios. In this form of collusion, a ‘‘hub” firm arranges vertical
restraints with a number of the downstream or upstream ‘‘spoke” firms with
which it interacts. These spoke firms collectively agree to adhere to the vertical
restraints of the hub firm. Illegality under price-fixing laws may arise if a ‘‘huband-spoke” arrangement artificially controls the price of a product. In terms of
algorithmic pricing, potential problems arise if a hub firm coordinates or is used
to coordinate the use of an identical pricing algorithm by the spoke firms.

31
32

33
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36

commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace>.
Ezrachi & Stucke, ‘‘Artificial Intelligence,” supra note 12 at 22.
See Ezrachi & Stucke, ‘‘Neural Networks,” supra note 21 at 8-12 for a discussion of
possible real-world examples, and a more critical view in Ittoo & Petit, supra note 21 at 23.
Ittoo & Petit, supra note 21 at 13.
Ezrachi & Stucke, ‘‘Neural Networks,” supra note 21 at 4.
Ibid at 16.
Ibid.
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A complex example of this hub-and-spoke scenario is currently subject to
litigation in the United States. In January 2016, an American man filed a civil
lawsuit against the founder of car service Uber, which serves to connect users
seeking transportation to drivers willing to provide transportation at a fee.37 The
civil action alleges that Uber is engaging in anti-competitive price-fixing by
requiring the drivers operating as part of their platform to use the same pricing
algorithm to determine fares, instead of allowing drivers to compete on price. 38
In a hub-and-spoke conceptualization of this scenario, the ‘‘hub” is Uber, the
vertical agreements are the requirement to use Uber’s pricing algorithm, and
there is an implied horizontal agreement between the ‘‘spoke” Uber drivers to use
the pricing algorithm.39
The spectrum of human control over algorithmic pricing is depicted in
Figure 1.

Figure 1: Human Control and Algorithmic Scenarios

CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER CANADIAN PRICEFIXING LAWS
This section of the paper intends to answer the following question: assuming
that there is evidence of coordination between competitors to achieve price
controls through the use of pricing algorithms, in what circumstances will it be
possible to establish corporate criminal liability for such coordination under
Canadian price-fixing laws? The conclusions of this analysis are summarized at
the end of this section.
In Canada, price-fixing is a criminal offence outlined in s. 45 of the
Competition Act, which reads as follows:
45 (1) Every person commits an offence who, with a competitor of that
person with respect to a product, conspires, agrees or arranges
(a) to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of
the product;
(b) to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the
production or supply of the product; or

37

38
39

Meyer, supra note 20; Nicholas Passaro, ‘‘How Meyer v. Kalanick Could Determine
How Uber and the Sharing Economy Fit into Antitrust Law,” 6:2 Mich Bus &
Entrepreneurial L Rev [forthcoming in 2018.
Meyer, supra note 20.
Passaro, supra note 37.
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(c) to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the
production or supply of the product.40

The penalties under s. 45 are up to 14 years’ imprisonment or a fine not exceeding
CAD 25 million, or both. The Act also outlines a defence which reads:
45 (4) No person shall be convicted of an offence under subsection (1)
in respect of a conspiracy, agreement or arrangement that would
otherwise contravene that subsection if
(a) that person establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that
(i) it is ancillary to a broader or separate agreement or
arrangement that includes the same parties, and
(ii) it is directly related to, and reasonably necessary for
giving effect to, the objective of that broader or
separate agreement or arrangement; and
(b) the broader or separate agreement or arrangement, considered alone, does not contravene that subsection.41

There is also a statutory exemption if the agreement is only entered into by firms
which are ‘‘in respect of every one of the others, an affiliate.” 42
There are three predominant factors to consider in assessing corporate
criminal liability for price-fixing in Canada. The following analysis considers
these factors in turn, and addresses their relation to the use of pricing algorithms.

1. Corporate actus reus
The actus reus component of s. 45 requires that a person ‘‘conspires, agrees,
or arranges” with a competitor to control the price of a product, control the
quantity of a product that is produced or supplied, or to ‘‘allocate sales,
territories, customers or markets for the production or supply” of a product. 43 A
corporation can become a party to the offence if any of its ‘‘senior officers,” 44
acting with the intent to benefit the organization and within the scope of their
authority, personally breaches s. 45, directs the work of other representatives of
the corporation with the effect of breaching s. 45, or, while ‘‘knowing that a
representative of the organization is or is about to be a party to the offence, does
not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a party to the
offence.”45
As such, the actus reus component of establishing corporate criminal liability
for a s. 45 offence is established if a senior officer of the corporation acts or fails
to act in one of the ways enumerated above.
40
41
42

43
44
45

Competition Act, supra note 8, s. 45(1).
Ibid, s. 45(4).
Ibid, s. 45(6); see contra notes 62-65 for a discussion of which personnel constitute ‘‘senior
officers.”
Ibid, s. 45(1).
Criminal Code, supra note 7, s. 22.2.
Ibid.
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The actus reus requirement is a straightforward consideration in the
‘‘messenger” situation, whereby two or more corporations design and
implement algorithms as tools to achieve a price-fixing agreement. In these
circumstances, there is a clear and explicit agreement between corporate
representatives in regard to using pricing algorithms to carry out price-fixing.
For similar reasons, establishing the actus reus may be straightforward in some
‘‘hub-and-spoke” scenarios although, as in the Uber example outlined above,
some hub-and-spoke scenarios may involve additional complexities.
The actus reus requirement is more difficult to establish in the autonomous
machine and predictable agent scenarios, in which algorithms may form a pricefixing arrangement without direct human intervention.
One line of argument asserts that there is no conspiracy, agreement, or
arrangement in such circumstances because machines are incapable of forming
an explicit agreement or arrangement in the way that humans are able to. Under
this line of thinking, any form of coordination between pricing algorithms would,
at most, fall under the category of tacit collusion, whereby competitors somehow
coordinate pricing without any explicit arrangements, or conscious parallelism, a
pricing phenomenon in oligopolistic markets whereby competitors recognize the
advantages of coordinated pricing without any explicit agreement. 46
The Canadian Competition Bureau’s policy on pursuing tacit collusion
under s. 45 is unclear, while Canadian courts have found that instances of
conscious parallelism does not fall under the purview of s. 45.47 In regard to s. 45,
the Bureau’s 2009 guidelines on enforcing the provision indicate that the Bureau
will consider tacit arrangements,48 while the 2001 guidelines state that ‘‘the
ability of a group of firms to coordinate actions without entering into an explicit
agreement can be addressed under the abuse provisions”49 in ss. 78 and 79 of the
Act.50
If one adopts the viewpoint that algorithms are able to form explicit
agreements without human intervention,51 there is the residual problem of
connecting the conduct of these pricing algorithms to the corporation. This same
issue has been dealt with in the field of electronic contract formation, in which
advanced programs may bind a legal person to a contract.52 According to law
46

47

48

49

50
51

WT Stanbury & GB Reschenthaler, “Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism: Theory,
Policy and the Canadian Cases” (1977) 15:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 617.
Michael Trebilcock, Edward M Iacobucci & Ralph A Winter, The Law and Economics of
Canadian Competition Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 112.
Canada, Competition Bureau, Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, December 2009
update (Gatineau: Competition Bureau, 2009) at 6.
Calvin S Goldman & John D Bodrug, eds, Competition Law of Canada, 1st ed
(Huntington, NY: Juris, 1996), at 9-103.
Competition Act, supra note 8, ss. 78-79.
See contra notes 78-82: EU regulators are considering the possibility of interpreting their
competition laws such that the term ‘‘communication” may be used to cover interactions
between algorithms.
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and technology scholar Professor Ian Kerr, a prominent approach, as found in
Canada’s Uniform Electronic Commerce Act53 and the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Electronic Commerce54 is to ‘‘treat the operations of the automated agent as a
mere extension of the actions of the human being who initiated its use.” 55 This
can be referred to as the ‘‘attribution rule,” and is a rule of absolute liability for
the originating human, as opposed to one based in principles of authority and
agency.56 Using the attribution rule in this way, the conduct of the pricing
algorithm could be taken to fulfill the actus reus of a corporate representative.
David C. Vladeck summarizes the logic behind this viewpoint as follows:
[t]he human hand defines, guides, and ultimately controls the process,
either directly or because of the capacity to override the machine and
seize control . . . Where the hand of human involvement in machine
decision-making is so evident, there is no need to reexamine liability
rules. Any human (or corporate entity that has the power to do things
that humans do, enter into contracts, hire workers, and so forth) that
has a role in the development of the machine and helps map out its
decision-making is potentially responsible for wrongful acts—negligent
or intentional—committed by, or involving, the machine. The reason,
of course, is that these machines, notwithstanding their sophistication,
have no attribute of legal personhood. They are agents or instruments
of other entities that have legal capacity as individuals, corporations, or
other legal ‘‘persons” that may be held accountable under the law for
their actions.57

However, as noted by Professor Kerr, adopting such a hardline approach ‘‘could
lead to unjust results in situations where a transaction generated by the
intelligent agent is unintended, unforeseen or unauthorized by its human
originator.”58
Of further note is some theoretical discussion in academic literature
regarding imbuing artificially intelligent machines or programs with legal
personhood.59 While this remains only an abstract possibility, it could be

52

53

54

55
56
57

58
59

Ian Kerr, “Ensuring the Success of Contract Formation in Agent-Mediated Electronic
Commerce” (2001) 1 Electronic Commerce Research Journal 183 at 191-193.
Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Uniform Electronic Commerce Act (Winnipeg:
Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 1998).
UN Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce (Vienna: United Nations, 1996).
Kerr, supra note 52 at 191.
Ibid.
David C. Vladeck, ‘‘Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial
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another way of attaching the actus reus of algorthimic price-fixing to a
corporation.

2. Corporate mens rea
Establishing mens rea is the key complicating factor in terms of assessing
corporate criminal liability for price-fixing related to the use of algorithmic
pricing. As corporations are not natural persons, the mens rea requirement is met
through the mens rea of a corporation’s ‘‘senior officers” as outlined in s. 22.2 of
the Criminal Code.60
The term ‘‘senior officer” is a very context-specific concept, which refers to
any representative of an organization ‘‘who plays an important role in the
establishment of an organization’s policies or is responsible for managing an
important aspect of the organization’s activities and, in the case of a body
corporate, includes a director, its chief executive officer and its chief financial
officer.”61 A senior officer can bind its corporation to a criminal offence if, ‘‘with
the intent at least in part to benefit the organization,”62 he or she,
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and
acting within the scope of their authority, directs the work of
other representatives of the organization so that they do the act or
make the omission specified in the offence; or
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to
be a party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to
stop them from being a party to the offence.63

This approach casts a broad and somewhat opaque net of criminal liability over
corporations in Canada.
While the jurisprudence regarding who qualifies as a ‘‘senior officer” is
nascent and quite limited, some insight can be gained from the case of R. c.
Pe´troles Global64 in which Justice Tôth of the Quebec Superior Court elaborated
on how courts should approach the senior officer concept. The critical elements
of Justice Tôth’s ruling are that assessing who is a senior officer requires a fully
contextualized analysis of the organization in question and the individual’s role
therein,65 that senior officers are not delineated solely by a specific title, 66 and
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that one can still be a senior officer even if their decisions must be approved by
another officer of the organization.67 Justice Tôth’s ruling confirmed that
corporate criminal liability in Canada has been expanded ‘‘outside the
boardroom and onto the plant floor”68 under the senior officer doctrine.
Given this extension of liability beyond only the highest levels of corporate
management, one immediate question in terms of assessing corporate criminal
liability for algorithmic price-fixing is whether those individuals designing pricing
algorithms can be deemed senior officers. This is clearly a context-dependent
question which will turn on the nature of the business, the corporate structure,
the size of the corporation, and the specific staffing arrangements within the
organization. However, in an organization engaging primarily in electronic
commerce, one could make a strong argument that those designing the structure
of pricing algorithms are responsible for ‘‘managing an important aspect of the
organization’s activities” as is required by the Criminal Code. Archibald, Jull,
and Roach state that senior officers should be thought of as ‘‘those employees
who are empowered to make business decision that involve the taking of
reasonable risks.”69 Determining how goods or services are priced seems like a
business decision that involves the taking of reasonable risks, and, at least in
some circumstances, the pricing classification of the algorithm designer as a
senior officer. As per Pe´troles Global, the fact that a higher level of management
may need to approve a pricing algorithm does not preclude the algorithm
designer from being classified as a senior officer.
With that in mind, the focus then shifts to examining the interconnection
between liability under s. 22.2 of the Criminal Code and the aforementioned
scenarios in which the use of pricing algorithms leads to violations of s. 45 of the
Competition Act. Section 22.2(a) is well-positioned to capture the messenger
scenario, assuming that a senior officer has arranged to use pricing algorithms as
a price-fixing tool with a competitor in order to benefit the corporation. This also
applies to the hub-and-spoke scenario.
The senior officer in either situation could be executive management, but, as
discussed above, the intent of an individual or individuals primarily responsible
for designing pricing algorithms may also be sufficient to establish corporate
criminal liability. Section 22.2(b) will also capture situations in which a senior
officer directs a subordinate, who may not be properly considered a senior
officer, to design or implement a pricing algorithm with the intent to commit
price-fixing under the Competition Act.
The mens rea requirement may also be fulfilled in the predictable agent
situation. The predictable agent scenario is marked by human intent to control
prices absent any formal agreement. As previously discussed, establishing the
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corporate actus reus will likely be the major challenge in regard to the predictable
agent scenario due to the lack of explicit agreement between competitors.
Finally, establishing the requisite mens rea in the ‘‘autonomous machine”
scenario will be difficult. Given the lack of human intent from the outset, activity
in such a scenario may only be captured under the Act if the algorithm designer
becomes aware that the pricing algorithm has developed some sort of price-fixing
scheme in coordination with competitor algorithms and does nothing to stop
this. This situation would potentially fall under s. 22.2(c), although this argument
would still require the classification of the pricing algorithm as a ‘‘representative”
of the organization. The Criminal Code defines a ‘‘representative” as a ‘‘director,
partner, employee, member, agent or contractor of the organization,” and, while
this appears to indicate that a representative must be a legal person, that
conclusion is not explicitly indicated in the text.70
The term ‘‘electronic agent” has been employed in the field of electronic
contract formation, but this term does not refer to a typical agency
relationship.71 The notes to Canada’s model law in this area are clear that ‘‘an
electronic agent is a tool, not an agent in law.”72 Under such a conceptualization,
it would be difficult to make the argument that algorithms are in fact standalone
representatives of the organization.

RELEVANT EXEMPTIONS AND DEFENCES
As outlined above, s. 45(4) of the Act offers an ‘‘ancillary restraints” defence,
which holds that an agreement that would otherwise fall under s. 45 does not
result in an offence if it is ancillary to a broader separate arrangement, and
reasonably necessary for giving effect to that broader agreement. This defence is
available to all potential violations of s. 45.
Section 45(5) provides a narrower defence available to price-fixing
agreements that relate only to the export of products from Canada.
Section 45(6) carves out an exemption for price-fixing arrangements entered
into by organizations which are ‘‘in respect of every one of the others, an
affiliate.”73 This includes all common subsidiaries of one parent corporation, as
well as the relationship between parent and subsidiary companies.74 Situations in
which a controlling hub corporation employs coordinated pricing algorithms for
spoke organizations under its control will be exempted as per s. 45(6).
Section 22.2(c) of the Criminal Code offers another possible avenue for
negating liability. While this particular paragraph has not been subject to
significant litigation, it appears from a common reading that the corporation will
70
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not be liable if a senior officer is not a party to the offence, has not directed a
representative to commit the offence, and takes ‘‘all reasonable steps” to stop a
representative of the organization from committing the offence. 75

SUMMARY
The following chart summarizes the above analysis, focusing specifically on
the likelihood of establishing corporate criminal liability under s. 45 of the
Competition Act, assuming participation by a senior officer and no evidentiary
concerns. As demonstrated by this chart, the likelihood of establishing corporate
criminal liability generally corresponds to the level of human control over the
actions of the algorithm.
It is valuable to consider this analysis of liability against the positions
submitted by the participants of the OECD Roundtable on algorithms and
collusion. The U.S. paper notes that if competitors directly communicate to use
an algorithm as a tool for price-fixing — as in the messenger situation or as in a
hub-and-spoke scenario, the competitors would likely be liable for price-fixing. 76
However, the U.S. paper is clear that ‘‘absent concerted action” between
competitors, there is no liability for price-fixing. 77 The U.S. paper does not
address the possibility for algorithms alone to be considered to be
communicating with one another.
The E.U. paper, while agreeing on the notion that explicit agreements
between competitors to use algorithms to price-fix will likely violate price-fixing
laws,78 takes a more expansive view of potential liability in situations where
algorithms interact without intentional human coordination. Of particular note,
the E.U. paper considers the possibility of ‘‘taking an expanded interpretation of
the notion of ‘communication’”79 under E.U. price-fixing laws, such that ‘‘one
could argue that through repeated interactions, two firms’ pricing algorithms
could come to ‘‘decode” each other, thus allowing each one to better anticipate
the other’s reactions.”80 The E.U. paper further suggests that ‘‘one cannot fully
rule out the possibility that more creative and novel types of interactions could in
certain situations meet the definition of ‘communication,’”81 and that ‘‘[i]f this is
or were to become possible in the future, the firms using such algorithms would
remain liable for their behaviour. It is up to the firms using algorithms to ensure
that their algorithms do not engage in illegal behaviour.”82
75
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Scenario

Establish actus reus?

Establish mens rea?

Defence?

Messenger

Likely

Likely

Potentially

Predictable agent

Unlikely, but possible
via attribution rule

Likely

Potentially

Autonomous machine

Unlikely, but possible
via attribution rule

Unlikely

Potentially

Hub-and-spoke

Likely

Likely

Potentially

Figure 2: Summary of Analysis

JUSTIFYING CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR ALGORITHMIC PRICEFIXING
This paper has focused on the question of whether it would be possible to
legally establish corporate criminal liability for algorithmic price-fixing in
Canada. However, what has not been discussed up to this point is whether we
should establish such liability.
As demonstrated above, it appears that it would be difficult to establish
corporate criminal liability for algorithmic price-fixing unless an explicit
agreement between humans led to the price-fixing. Given this conclusion, the
question then becomes whether we believe this is how our criminal law should
operate.
This is a substantial and complex question, and this paper does not intend to
provide a definite answer. However, the following analysis sketches the general
contours of the philosophical debate that could occur around this point.
It is well-established that criminal law is intended to condemn and punish for
wrongdoing.83 The value in criminally punishing humans or corporations for
algorithmic price-fixing may vary in line with different theories of criminal
punishment.
A utilitarian account of criminal punishment provides the theoretical
bedrock for criminal law in Canada, and focuses on the societal value of using
the criminal justice system to deter particular conduct and rehabilitate those who
commit undesirable conduct.84 Utilitarianism seems to provide a strong
justification for imposing criminal punishment in situations where humans
83
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simply use pricing algorithms as a tool to carry out a price-fixing agreement.
From a utilitarian perspective, a situation of this nature does not differ from any
other price-fixing agreement.
However, the utilitarian value somewhat decreases in line with the level of
human involvement or direction in the outcome generated by the algorithm. If an
algorithm generates outcomes that were not specifically intended or directed by a
human, it seems difficult to justify the use of criminal punishment to deter the
occurrence of future outcomes that are similarly generated. The value of any
such punishment would be broad and cumbersome; the principal effect would be
to deter the use of any pricing algorithm that has the ability to learn and develop
without human intervention. It is difficult to see how, in situations where pricefixing is an unintended act of algorithmic pricing, criminal punishment could act
as a deterrent to the specific criminal outcome of algorithmic price-fixing without
deterring the use of pricing algorithms writ large. There may be deterrent value in
terms of encouraging humans to closely monitor the outcomes generated by their
pricing algorithms, though in general, the use of criminal punishment in relation
to algorithmic price-fixing is most soundly justified by utilitarian principles in
situations where humans have agreed to a price-fixing arrangement.
Utilitarian theories of criminal punishment operate alongside normative
theories, such as the retributive theory. A retributive account of punishment, a
theory which also runs strong through Canadian criminal jurisprudence, 85 holds
that criminal punishment should be used to ‘‘sanction the moral culpability of
the offender.”86 Chief Justice Lamer, writing on behalf of a unanimous Supreme
Court of Canada (S.C.C.) in R. v. M. (C.A.), described retributive justice, and
specifically differentiated retributive justice from vengeance:
Vengeance, as I understand it, represents an uncalibrated act of harm
upon another, frequently motivated by emotion and anger, as a reprisal
for harm inflicted upon oneself by that person. Retribution in a
criminal context, by contrast, represents an objective, reasoned and
measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly
reflects the moral culpability of the offender, having regard to the
intentional risk-taking of the offender, the consequential harm caused
by the offender, and the normative character of the offender’s conduct.
Furthermore, unlike vengeance, retribution incorporates a principle of
restraint; retribution requires the imposition of a just and appropriate
punishment, and nothing more. As R. Cross has noted in The English
Sentencing System (2nd ed. 1975), at p. 121: ‘‘The retributivist insists
that the punishment must not be disproportionate to the offender’s
deserts.”87
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Another normative justification for criminal punishment can be gleaned from the
expressive theory of punishment.88 This view of punishment uses the imposition
of criminal sanction to ‘‘communicate society’s condemnation of that particular
offender’s conduct.”89 It has been described by the Supreme Court of Canada in
regard to the purposes of criminal sentencing, as follows:
[A] sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic,
collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for
encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within
our substantive criminal law. As Lord Justice Lawton stated in R. v.
Sargeant (1974), 60 Cr. App. R. 74, at p. 77: ‘‘society, through the
courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime, and the
only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they
pass.”90

Once again, it appears straightforward to justify criminal punishment under
these normative principles in situations where humans have agreed to a pricefixing agreement using algorithms as the tool to carry out the agreement.
However, the question of whether normative principles can justify criminal
punishment for outcomes generated by pricing algorithms without specific
human direction is more complex. Normative justification is based on
sanctioning ‘‘moral culpability” or expressing ‘‘society’s condemnation” of a
particular act or omission. However, unlike other criminal offences, our society
does not have a clear moral position regarding the blameworthiness of a legal
person for the unintended outcomes produced by semi-autonomous or
autonomous machines that the legal person created. This question has broader
ramifications beyond those associated with algorithmic price-fixing. Our societal
norms regarding the human culpability of autonomously acting machines have
yet to take form, and, until they do, it will be difficult to ground any criminal
punishment for unintended algorithmic price-fixing in normative principles.
It is crucial to emphasize that utilitarian and normative justifications for
criminal punishment are not mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather ‘‘operate
in conjunction with one another to provide a coherent justification for criminal
punishment.”91 Based on the discussion above, it is clear that both utilitarian and
normative principles can justify criminal punishment for price-fixing agreements
in which algorithms are used as the tool to carry out the agreement. The grounds
for justifying punishment in situations with less explicit human intention to form
a price-fixing agreement are significantly less solid.
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CONCLUSION
The principal issue considered in this paper, namely the intersection between
algorithmic pricing and competition law, constitutes only one part of what is a
much larger question. Artificial intelligence and semi-autonomous machine
decision-makers have entered our economy and society with remarkable pace
and ubiquity. Legal systems around the world have been slow to answer the
questions posed by these technological developments.
A 2018 report of Canada’s Competition Bureau on big data and innovation
attempted to address some of these issues, and specifically discussed the impact
of computerized algorithms on the enforcement of Canada’s price-fixing laws. 92
The Bureau’s report is clear on two issues. First, it affirms that the Bureau
intends to work within the parameters of Canada’s existing competition laws in
order to address the issues lying at the intersection of price-fixing and
computerized algorithms.93 Second, the report is clear that formal agreements
between competitors to fix prices using sophisticated algorithms will be viewed in
the same vein as agreements to fix prices using less sophisticated means. 94
The report also acknowledges the possibility that situations will arise where
‘‘cartel agreements are reached purely through interactions between different AI
technologies, absent any direct human involvement.”95 However, the Bureau
avoids issuing any guidance on this possibility, writing, ‘‘[t]he Bureau has
observed no evidence of this type of collusion but is aware of the theoretical
debate about how it might manifest. Nevertheless, without the benefit of
evidence about the nature, or even feasibility, of such collusion, it is premature to
provide guidance.”96
This paper explored how a spectrum of possible situations involving human
control over algorithmic price-fixing squares with Canada’s current criminal law
regarding collusion. Based on the analysis, it is difficult to challenge the legal or
theoretical legitimacy of imposing criminal liability on humans and corporations
for intentionally using algorithms to carry out price-fixing agreements. However,
both the legal and theoretical legitimacy for imposing criminal liability are
significantly undermined if pricing algorithms develop a price-fixing arrangement
absent any human direction.
As such, a tension arises between the problematic nature of imposing
criminal liability for outcomes generated without human direction, and the
benefits associated with attempting to mitigate the occurrence of such anticompetitive outcomes. A provision for issuing a civil regulatory sanction, such as
ss. 90 or 79 of the Act, presents a tool to resolve this tension. The use of a civil
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provision would allow the Bureau to regulate anti-competitive outcomes
generated by pricing algorithms while avoiding the difficulties associated with
formally establishing the elements of the s. 45 criminal offence. Other than a
situation in which humans use algorithms to carry out a formal price-fixing
agreement, the complexity associated with algorithmic price-fixing merits a
flexible regulatory approach that is not bound by the strict confines of criminal
punishment.

